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The propagation of failures and blackouts in electric networks is a complex problem. Typical models, such as the
ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA), are based on a combination of fast and a slow dynamics. The first describes the cascading
failures while the second the grid evolution though line and generation upgrades as well as demand growth, all taking
place in time scales from days to years. The growing integration of renewable energy sources, whose power fluctuates
in time scales from seconds to hours, together with the increase in demand, which also present fast fluctuations, require
the incorporation of distributed methods of control in the demand side to avoid the high cost of ordinary control in
conventional power plants. In this work, we extend the OPA model to include fluctuations in the demand at time scales
of the order of minutes, intraday demand variations and the effect of demand control. We find that demand control
effectively reduces the number of blackouts without increasing the probability of large-scale events.
While typically blackouts models are intended for years-
long evolution of the power grid with a basic time scale of
one day, demand fluctuations require of faster time scales
for a proper analysis. The progressive reduction of con-
ventional power plants in benefit of renewable sources in-
troduces generation fluctuations on top of those intrinsic
to demand, while overall system’s inertia and control ca-
pability are reduced. A way to cope with that is the use
of demand management techniques. This work addresses
the integration of fast fluctuations and demand control in
a prototypical model for blackout propagation in power
grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power transmission networks are composed by a large num-
ber of power plants (mostly powered by fossil fuels), sub-
stations and consumers, all connected by transmission lines.
Such networks are susceptible to failures caused by defective
system components, lack of maintenance, human mistakes,
bad weather, etc. A failure of a line can propagate through
the network and trigger other failures leading to a blackout.
This propagation, also called cascading failures, is known as
the usual mechanism responsible for large blackouts of the
electric transmission network system. There are many exam-
ples around the world of very large blackouts triggered by cas-
cading failures. These examples include the November 1965
blackout in the Northeast of the US and Ontario in Canada,
which left more than 30 million people without electricity, the
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Sciences, Dolejškova 1402/5, 182 00 Praha 8, Czech Republic.
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August 1996 blackout in Western North America that discon-
nected 7.5 million customers, the August 2003 blackout in
northeastern America which affected about 55 million people,
the September 2003 Italian blackout which disconnected 57
million people, and the March 2015 Turkey blackout affect-
ing 70 million people. Electric blackouts in all the cases have
enormous consequences affecting social life, security, health
and human activities. Therefore their understanding and anal-
ysis is of great importance1,2.
The analysis of blackouts consists typically of constructing
a model, based on available blackouts data, and using statis-
tical techniques, physical laws, and engineering methods to
gain insight about the processes involved in the failures of
the system. To validate the model results are compared to
blackout data available, for instance, from the NERC (North
Electrical Reliability Council) for North American blackouts.
Indeed, the data analysis of the North America blackouts has
shown that the probability distribution of the size of black-
outs as measured by the load shed or the number of customers
disconnected, has a power law tail3–6 characteristic of dynam-
ical systems close to a critical point. Self-Organized Critical-
ity (SOC)7 has then been suggested as one possible principle
governing this dynamics8. The idea behind the power grid as
a SOC system is that its dynamics results from the balance
between an increasing demand and the engineering response
to this growth. In this context the operation and evolution of
power transmission system is defined by two time scales: a
fast and a slow. The fast time scale models blackout prop-
agation. The slow time scale models the secular increase of
the power demand, the engineering response to failures, and
updating the power generation. The dynamical evolution of
the system under these forces self-organizes close to a critical
state. Hence the cascading failures and blackouts in the elec-
tric transmission network can be modeled as a SOC system.
Several SOC based models of blackouts have been proposed
in the literature4,7–9. That includes: the hidden failure model2,
the OPA (ORNL-PSerc-Alaska) model1,8,10, the Manchester
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model based on load shedding and ac power11 and a blackout
model based on OPF (Optimal flow analysis)12.
Nowadays, the need for reducing the emission of green-
house gases into the atmosphere (mostly caused by fossil fu-
els burned in traditional power plants) to avoid climate change
is promoting an increase of renewable energy sources, mainly
wind and solar power. This is contributing to switch from a
dirty to a clean or blue electric network. The fluctuations in-
troduced by the renewables, however, combined with those of
the consumers are increasing the difficulty to balance the de-
mand and supply. Such fluctuations are very difficult to man-
age from the supply side and they are an important source of
instability. To cope with this new scenario different methods
and concepts have been proposed to control the system from
the demand side, what is know as demand-side management
(DSM)13. Roughly speaking DSM consists in encouraging
consumers through education, incentives and technologies to
use the energy more efficiently adapting their needs to the in-
stant available power.
A large variety of DSM methods has been proposed13, in-
cluding those not requiring user intervention relying, for in-
stance, in technologies such as smart devices combined with
bidirectional communication between a Load Serving Entity
(LSE) and the smart devices14. The LSE sends a real time
price signal to the devices so that if the price is high the de-
vice can postpone a task. Devices suitable for the implementa-
tion of this methodology include heaters, boilers, dishwashers,
washing machines, air conditioners, refrigerators, chargeable
devices, etc. Another DSM methodology not requiring user
intervention is that of Dynamic Demand Control (DDC)15,
where the same kind of devices can postpone a task if the fre-
quency of the grid is outside a given range. By relying on
the local measurement of the instantaneous frequency DDC
does not require communications. DDC has been shown to
reduce small and medium size frequency fluctuations15,16 and
improve the synchronization on the network17. However the
probability of large frequency fluctuations due to the recovery
of pending tasks increases16. This happens despite randomiz-
ing the recovery of pending tasks. Although rare, these events
are associated to large demand peaks that can trigger a black-
out. Recently we have introduced a modified DDC protocol18
in which devices in a group communicate and coordinate op-
posite actions aiming at minimizing group demand variations.
This communication enhanced DDC algorithm significantly
reduces the number of pending tasks so that large frequency
fluctuations are practically suppressed.
The aim of this work is to introduce demand control in the
context of the OPA model and explore to which extend this
control can be effective in avoiding the blackouts even in pres-
ence of fast demand fluctuations. To achieve this goal, we
first extend the OPA model to include i) fluctuations in the
demand at time scales much smaller than a day, ii) intraday
demand variations, and iii) the effect of demand control. De-
mand fluctuations account for sudden switching-on of groups
of devices and are modeled as power bursts taking place with a
small probability at randomly selected nodes. As expected in-
troducing demand fluctuations increases the number of black-
outs. Demand control is here implemented considering that
FIG. 1. Electric network of n= 400 nodes including nGL = 60 nodes
with generation and load capacity and nL = 340 load nodes, con-
nected by 617 transmission lines.
nodes include smart devices capable of postponing intended
power bursts if the total demand is above a certain threshold.
Pending tasks are recovered if total demand is below a certain
recovery threshold.
This paper is structured as follows: In section II we summa-
rize the OPA model. In section III we extend the OPA model
to include intraday demand variation, random power bursts
and demand control. In section IV we present the results ob-
tained. Finally, in section V we summarize the paper and give
some concluding remarks.
II. THE OPA MODEL
In this paper, we consider an artificial network built accord-
ing to the prescriptions of Reference19. The network is com-
posed by n= 400 nodes, out of which nL = 340 have only load
while nGL = 60 have load and generation capacity, connected
by 617 undirected lines (See Fig. 1).
The network is characterized by the following parameters:
• Pi is the instantaneous power demand at bus i. The total
demand is PD = ∑iPi.
• Pgi is the power generated in the node i. The maximum
generator capacity in node i is Pmaxi and PG =∑iPmaxi is
the total generation capacity.
• Fi j is the instantaneous power flow on line (i, j) where
i and j are the nodes connected by the line. Fmaxi j is the
maximum power flow supported by line (i, j).
• zi j is the impedance of line (i, j).
• CM is the generation margin defined as CM = (PG −
PD)/PD.
Further details on the network characteristics can be found in8.
The OPA model1,10 considers two timescales. The fast dy-
namics effectively describes the line overloads and outages
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that result from the generation dispatch and which may cause
blackouts. The slow dynamics, which occur in a time scale of
days to years, simulate the development of the power system,
through uniform daily demand growth, line improvements,
generation limit upgrades, maintenance of defective electric
components etc. This is done in response to the demand in-
crease and to prevent a future failure which could happen in
the fast dynamical process. The slow evolution of the system
is as follows:
• All loads are increased by a factor λ¯ , representing the
secular daily increase of load. λ¯ is chosen based on the
past of demand growth rate in US, which corresponds
to 2% annual demand growth.
• The maximum generator power is increased when the
generation margin CM reaches a critical value which
here is chosen to be 0.2
• The daily variability in power demand is modeled as a
random fluctuation of loads.
• Lines outaged or overloaded on a blackout, on the next
day are fixed and upgraded by multiplying their previ-
ous capacity by a constant parameter µ .
The basic time step for load dispatching is one day. Prior to
load dispatching the model considers that each line has a prob-
ability p0 of failing. Considering the available lines, load is
dispatched using the standard linear programming technique.
If, resulting from dispatch, a line is overloaded it can fail in-
stantaneously with a probability p1. In case of a line outage,
power is dispatched again and again until no more line fail-
ures are produced. The final solution may have some load
shed, LS, in which case we evaluate the ratio of LS to the total
power demand, PD. If this ratio is larger than 10−5 the event is
officially a blackout. The overall stress of the power grid state
is measured by 〈M〉 = 〈 1N ∑i, jMi, j〉 where 〈〉 corresponds to
time averages, N is the number of lines and Mi j is fractional
line overload Mi j = Fi j/Fmaxi j .
III. EXTENSIONS OF THE OPA MODEL
As discussed in the previous section the standard OPA
model considers a daily variability in the demand together
with its secular growth. However within a day the demand
is considered constant. In order to properly model the effect
of demand control it is necessary to consider the consump-
tion varying at time scales much shorter than a day. Thus, we
consider a basic time step of 5 minutes. At every time step
dispatch takes place according to the load at that time and fol-
lowing the same procedure as in the original model. Besides,
we introduce three extensions of the OPA model allowing to
address the intraday variability in consumption, a fast vari-
ability in the load in the form of power burst and the effect of
demand management techniques.
FIG. 2. Daily variation of the demand (red line) and generation limit
(blue line) as described in subsection III A. The horizontal black lines
shows the control and recovery thresholds, PL1 and PL2, as described
in subsection III C.
A. Intraday variability
We consider that the power demand not only has random
fluctuations from day to day but also follows an evolution pat-
tern along a single day. Fig. 2 shows the intraday evolution of
the total power demand PD and the power generation limit PG
During a single day there are two peaks of consump-
tion, the first occurring in the morning, represents commer-
cial/industrial consumption and the second one which hap-
pens in the early night represents domestic/home consump-
tion. The day to day random variability present in the original
model translates here in a random vertical translation of the
power demand profile. Furthermore, as in the original model,
from one day to the next, demand is increased by a factor λ¯ to
account for the secular load increase.
The generation limit, on the other hand, varies following the
typical demand profile to ensure the availability of the power
at any time. As in the original model, maximum generation
power is increased if the generation margin CM goes below
0.2.
B. Power bursts
On top of the intraday demand variation we introduce a
fast dynamical load including sudden random power bursts to
model unpredicted power load increases or sudden switching-
on of groups of devices in the system. At every time step,
every node i has a probability p3 to have a power burst of ran-
dom amplitude, such that the consumed power Pi is
Pi(t) = (1+b|r|)Pi,0(t), (1)
where Pi,0(t) is power demand at node i following the intraday
variation and r is a Gaussian random number of zero mean and
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FIG. 3. Burst power, b|r|Pi,0, for bursts taking place on a typical day
with b= 0.1.
variance 1, truncated at 5 so that power burst are positive and
bounded to a maximum amplitude. The parameter b controls
the amplitude of the power burst. Increasing its value stresses
the network. An example of the of bursts occurring in a typical
day is show in Fig. 3. Note that bursts take place at random
nodes and its size is proportional to the node power not to the
total consumption, thus the fact that the total consumption is
smaller at night does not imply bursts should be smaller at that
time. The frequency of blackouts and the distribution of the
size of blackout strongly depend on the size of the power burst
distribution as we will see in the next Section.
C. Demand control in the OPA model
We consider that at all nodes include smart devices capa-
ble of postponing intended power bursts occurring at times of
large consumption. These tasks that has been postponed can
be recovered when the consumption is below a certain recov-
ery limit. It is not necessary that all devices have that capabil-
ity, nor that the device intending to trigger the burst is capable
to delay it. Considering communicated devices within a node
is just necessary that there are enough devices capable to turn
off or decrease consumption if a power burst is triggered by
any another device.
More precisely we define two power levels PL1 (the control
threshold) the power above which the power bursts are de-
layed and PL2 (the recovery threshold) the power below which
the delayed power bursts can be recovered with a certain prob-
ability p4. This randomization in the recovery is necessary to
avoid all postponed burst being recovered simultaneously as
soon as the power goes below the recovery threshold, which
would induce a large demand peak. Here for simplicity we
will consider a value for PL1 and PL2 which remains constant
along the day as shown in Fig. 2. The idea behind setting the
thresholds in this way is reminiscent of that of Time-Of-Use
FIG. 4. Rank function of blackout sizes (load shed normalized to the
power demand) for the reference case
(TOU) demand response program in which consumption on
the hours of large demand is discouraged by applying a larger
price. Here we do not intend to shift part of the scheduled
consumption to the time in which the grid demand is smaller,
just the power bursts.
It is also possible to consider that PL1 varies along the day,
for instance following the daily demand variation. In this way
small burst are allowed at any time while large power burst
are delayed. Considering intraday variations of PL2 is also
possible. Here we focus on the case of constant thresholds
as shown in Fig. 2. Variable thresholds will be considered
elsewhere.
IV. RESULTS
As baseline reference case we consider the OPA model
without power burst nor demand control. Model parameters
are given in Table I. With these parameters the average fre-
quency of blackouts per day is 0.3. Fig. 4 shows the Rank
distribution of load sheds normalized to the total power de-
mand LS/PD for the range in which the load sheds can be offi-
cially considered as blackouts. For large blackouts the rank
distribution shows a power law behavior with an exponent
1.88, relatively similar to the blackout distribution observed
for North-America20.
Next we consider the effect of power burst taking place with
a probability rate p3 = 0.0025 per time step and node as func-
tion of the burst amplitude b. Figs. 5 and 6 display respec-
tively the average frequency and size of blackouts increasing
b. Without control (red circles) the random power burst trigger
additional load sheds and, thus, blackout frequency increases
while the average size decreases.
We now consider the effect of power busts together with de-
mand control using parameters PL1 and PL2 shown in Fig. 2.
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TABLE I. Parameters used in the model
Parameters Value Observations
p0 1.44×10−6 Probability rate of a failure of a line (per day)
p1 0.01 Probability of failure of an overloaded line
p3 0.00025 Probability rate of a burst (per node and timestep)
p4 0.00125 Probability rate to recover a delayed burst (per node and timestep)
λ¯ 1.00058 Rate of demand increase (per day)
µ 1.07 Rate of increasing current limit if the generation margin CM reaches 0.2
Applying control (blue squares) there is a range of values of
b, b < 0.1, for which the control is very effective. In this
range the blackout average frequency is kept similar (or even
slightly reduced with respect) to that of the reference case.
Fig. 6 shows that in this range the average size of blackouts
slight increases. This is due to an increase in the middle size
blackouts, not to a change in the power tail, as can be seen in
Fig. 7. This is because the control moves bursts to the hours
in which the grid is less stressed. This is a real improvement
over other types of control that we have studied21,22 for which
the basic time scale was 1 day and did not have the capability
to translate tasks to hours of less consumption.
As seen in Fig. 5, for any value of b control reduces the fre-
quency of blackouts as compared with the case without con-
trol. Despite this reduction, for b> 0.1 demand control as im-
plemented is not capable of keeping the blackout frequency
below the baseline reference level. For larger values of b the
frequency of blackouts increases practically linearly with b
despite control, and the blackout Rank distribution with and
without control are very similar as shown in Fig. 8.
We now focus on the overall stress of the power grid mea-
sured by 〈M〉. Without control, increasing b the stress 〈M〉
decreases, as shown in Fig. 9 (red circles). This is associ-
ated to the fact of having a large number of blackouts. Since
FIG. 5. Blackout average frequency with (blue squares) and without
(red circles) control as a function of power burst amplitude b.
after a blackout the capacity of the affected lines is increased,
other conditions being equal, as the frequency of blackouts in-
creases the overall stress of the system decreases. Thus black-
outs can be viewed as a way for the system to release stress.
With control, for b < 0.1 the level of stress as measured
by 〈M〉 remains practically the same as the baseline reference
system without bursts (See the blue square symbols in Fig. 9).
For b > 0.1, the stress drops fast as b increases. This is a
consequence of having an overall larger number of blackouts
and also of moving burst to the night and morning hours and
producing blackouts in those range of times in which the stress
of the system is lower than in the peak of the demand.
We now address the distribution of blackouts along the
day as shown in Fig.10 for b = 0.075, within the range in
which control is fully effective. Without control (red symbols)
most of the blackouts take place in the evening in correspon-
dence with the maximum of demand. There is also a small a
secondary peak associated to the morning peak demand. In
this case the application of control (blue symbols) does not
changes the qualitative shape of the intraday blackout distri-
bution, although the size peaks is significantly reduced.
The picture changes for b > 0.1. In this case, the removal
of the bursts from the peak of the demand causes a significant
amount of blackouts during night and early morning, when
FIG. 6. Blackout averaged size with and without control as a function
of power burst size b.
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FIG. 7. Rank function of the blackout size distribution with and with-
out control for b = 0.075, within the range in which the control is
fully effective.
FIG. 8. Rank function of the blackout size distribution with and with-
out control for power burst amplitude b= 0.3.
the system is less stressed as shown in Fig. 11.
Most of the blackouts in the system are triggered by a ran-
dom failure of a transmissions lines. The larger blackouts are
caused by line overloads and the associated outages of lines
during the redistpach. Power is redistributed through other
paths which can lead to subsequent failures leaving unserved
a part of the network, generating then a large blackout. So
the number of lines overloaded during a blackout is another
way to characterize the dynamics. Fig. 12 shows an histogram
with the number of overloaded lines during blackouts without
control and with control for b< 0.1. Without control, the his-
togram is bimodal with a large peak corresponding to black-
outs affecting only 1 or 2 lines and another peak around 8
FIG. 9. Overall stress of the system as measured by 〈M〉 with and
without control as a function of power burst amplitude b
FIG. 10. Intraday distribution of blackouts with and without control
for b= 0.075.
lines. When control is applied the overall number of events
decreases (which is consistent with the reduction of the black-
out frequency shown in Fig.5). This reduction is most effec-
tive for the events involving a few lines as shown in Fig. 12, so
that the first peak in the histogram disappears while the second
slightly broadens.
Without control increasing b, the overall number of black-
outs increases, but it is specially significant the increase of
the number of blackouts involving a few lines. This can be
seen comparing the histogram shown in red symbols in Fig. 13
with that of Fig. 12. For b = 0.2 the first peak is about three
times higher than for b= 0.025. As a consequence the average
number of lines involved in a blackout decreases in correspon-
dence with the reduction of the overall stress measured as 〈M〉
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FIG. 11. Intraday distribution of blackouts with and without control
for b= 0.3.
(Fig. 9). For b> 0.1 control still reduces the number of black-
outs involving a few lines, however is not sufficient to fully
remove the first peak of the histogram.
FIG. 12. Distribution of the number of lines involved in a blackout
with and without control for b= 0.025.
So far we have focused on the effect of the power burst
amplitude b. We now address the effect of the probability of
the burst p3 in the control effectiveness. To do so, we con-
sider the simultaneous variation of b and p3 such that bp3 is
kept constant. Fig. 14 shows the blackout frequency with in-
creasing b while keeping bp3 = 0.00002. We can see that the
results are very similar to those shown in Fig. 5 where p3 was
kept constant, indicating that the effect of p3 is not much rel-
evant. In Fig. 15, we have plotted the ratio fB(p3)/ fB0 where
fB(p3) is the blackout frequency obtained changing p3 while
FIG. 13. Distribution of the number of lines involved in a blackout
with and without control for b= 0.2.
FIG. 14. Blackout frequency with and without control as b is in-
creased keeping bp3 = 0.00002 constant.
keeping bp3 = 0.00002 and fB0 is the blackout frequency for
p3 = 0.00025. This ratio, which is shown as a function of p3,
varies vary little around 1. We conclude that the relevant pa-
rameter to determine power burst effects is the amplitude, b,
rather than the probability to take place, p3.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have extended the OPA model to include intraday vari-
ability in demand, a fast variability in consumption in the form
of power bursts taking place randomly at load nodes and the
effect of demand management techniques.
Introducing random power bursts leads a clear increase in
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FIG. 15. Ratio of the blackout frequency obtained changing p3 while
keeping bp3 = 0.00002 to the blackout frequency obtained for p3 =
0.00025 (see text). This ratio is shown as a function of p3.
the frequency of blackouts as compared to a baseline refer-
ence case with daily variations but without bursts. The main
parameter in determining the effects is the burst amplitude b
while the specific value for the probability of the burst to take
place is not that relevant. The blackout frequency increases
with b practically in a linear way while the average blackout
size slightly decreases. Blackouts occur mainly at the period
of the day in which the load is larger. Considering the num-
ber of lines which are overloaded, the distribution is bimodal
with one peak associated to blackouts involve only one or two
lines, and another involving about 8 lines. Increasing b the
first peak becomes more prominent while the second moves
towards a smaller number of lines.
Demand control is here implemented considering that
nodes include smart devices capable of postponing intended
power bursts if the total demand is above a certain thresh-
old. Pending tasks are recovered if total demand is below a
certain recovery threshold. Control displaces power bursts
occurring at peak hours to valley hours, significantly reduc-
ing the overall frequency of blackouts as compared with the
non-controlled case. This reduction is particularly relevant
for blackouts involving the overloading of 1 or 2 lines.
Furthermore there is a parameter range (up to b < 0.1) for
which demand control is fully effective in avoiding the effect
of power bursts. The frequency of the blackouts is similar (or
even slightly smaller) than that without power bursts. In par-
ticular blackouts involving 1 or 2 overloaded lines are fully
avoided. Remarkably, the distribution of blackouts does not
show long tails which is an improvement over other control
mechanisms considered in the OPA model21,22 in which the
translation of tasks to hours of lower demand was not consid-
ered.
While here we have considered an specific grid network
with 400 nodes, we expect qualitative results are general.
Nevertheless, since the network considered has a limited size,
in future works it would be appropriate to extend the calcu-
lations to larger networks to characterize quantitatively the
dependence on the network size. Also the effect of having
an intraday profile for control and recovery thresholds will be
addresses elsewhere.
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